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Abstract—The security issue of mobile robots have attracted
considerable attention in recent years. Most existing works
focus on detection and countermeasures for some classic attacks
from cyberspace. Nevertheless, those work are generally based
on some prior assumptions for the attacker (e.g., the system
dynamics is known, or internal access is compromised). A few
work are delicated to physical attacks, however, there still lacks
certain intelligence and advanced control design. In this paper,
we propose a physical-based and intelligent attack framework
against the obstacle-avoidance of mobile robots. The novelty of
our work lies in the following: i) Without any prior information of
the system dynamics, the attacker can learn the detection area
and goal position of a mobile robot by trial and observation,
and the obstacle-avoidance mechanism is learned by support
vector regression (SVR) method; ii) Considering different attack
requirements, different attack strategies are proposed to imple-
ment the attack efficiently; iii) The framework is suitable for
holonomic and non-holonomic mobile robots, and the algorithm
performance analysis about time complexity and optimality is
provided. Furthermore, the condition is obtained to guarantee
the success of the attack. Simulations illustrate the effectiveness
of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
With network communication, integrated computation and
control to support the operations in the physical world, the
mobile robots can be seen as a typical Cyber-Physical System
(CPS). Due to excellent flexibility and scalability, mobile
robots have been a research hotspot in the field of control and
robotics and receive considerable attention. From unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) to unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs),
either single or multiple coordinated, mobile robots are becom-
ing more and more pervasive in both industrial and military
fields, e.g., logistics transportation, environment exploration,
and military reconnaissance.
Due to the increasing usage of mobile robots in a wide
range of application domains, the security issue has become
an essential requirement and imperative challenge [1]. The
security shows the ability of a system to govern malicious
behaviors or unanticipated events [2]. Attacks against the
mobile robots are mainly from cyber space, and they can be
roughly divided into three categories: DoS, replay, and de-
ception attacks [3]. In those attacks, communication channels
are maliciously jammed/disrupted [4], or the control data and
measurements are compromised/altered [5], thus degenerating
the mission effectiveness of mobile robots in critical and
adversarial scenarios. Many efforts have been devoted to
designing corresponding countermeasures. For instance, [6]
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addresses the problem of ensuring trustworthy computation in
a linear consensus network with misbehaving agents. In [7],
undetectable and unidentifiable attacks are characterized and
detection filters are designed. And [8] considers the secure
estimation when the set of attacked nodes can change with
time. However, most of the existing research rely on a baseline
premise that the attacker has some knowledge or access to
the formation system. For example, malicious agents have
knowledge of system structure or nodes’ states [6], or the
packets transmitted over network are corrupted [9], [10]. These
assumptions neglect the capacity limitations of the attacker in
real scenarios, especially most of them are too hard for the
attacker to actually implement. Therefore, there still remain
potential gaps between theory and practice, concerning how
to implement these kinds of attack or under what conditions
the attack is possible to be launched.
Moreover, there are also a few work focusing on physical
attacks, where the physical components are considered as
attack target to make the attacks stealthy. For instance, the GPS
sensor readings can be disturbed by GPS spoofing attack [11]–
[13]. Designed acoustic noises can alter gyroscopic sensor
data, leading to drone crashes [14]. Even the important values
stored in memory (e.g, EEPROM, Flash memory) can be
corrupted by heating up a memory cell while the device is
without ang damage [15]. Compared with cyber attacks, these
physical attacks are straightforward to implement, and tradi-
tional detection techniques from computer security community
are usually not effective and powerful to handle them [1].
Nevertheless, this does not mean these physical attacks are
impeccable. In fact, they are still not smart and advanced
enough. On one hand, the attacks are generally against a
specific kind transducer by utilizing its sensing mechanism,
and the attack methods are not generalized. On the other hand,
those physical attack is designed with a “open-loop”-like idea,
only aiming to disturb the system performance more or less,
without any specific attack purpose and sophisticated control
design.
Motivated by above observation, we design a physical-based
and intelligent attack scheme against the obstacle-avoidance
of mobile robots. We describe it as “intelligent” for it reflects
an intellectual growth of learning knowledge and mastering
skills, like a child who knows nothing gradually acquires every
ability he needs by observing and trying. The novelty lies in
that we do not aim to design an attack against a single type
of sensors, but against the intrinsic mechanism of obstacle-
avoidance for the mobile robots.
Note that a reliable obstacle-avoidance methodology is
extremely crucial for the effectiveness of navigation, which
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is universally needed and vital technology in almost all
applications of mobile robots [16]. Normally, the mobile
robots are equipped with transducers such as sonar, laser
radar or cameras, to detect surrounding environments. After
the environment information is gathered by the transducer, it
transmits the information to the controller to make decisions
by pre-programmed algorithms to tackle different situations.
However, no matter what sensor and what obstacle-avoidance
approach the mobile robot uses, it will not make a difference
to our proposed attack method, for only the changes of robot’s
posture are needed in our method.
The proposed framework works as follows. First, we pro-
pose a learning scheme for the attacker to learn the obstacle-
avoidance mechanism of the mobile robots. It seeks to solve
what information is needed and how to obtain these informa-
tion in a feasible way to launch an attack. In fact, considering
the attackers are quite powerful (as most existing works do)
may lead to a robust defence for the system, but it also
sacrifices the normal control performance to some degree (e.g,
hardware burdens and computation complexity). The tradeoff
between them is not easy to balance. From our point of view,
if this gap between attack and defence is filled, the design
of countermeasures for attacks will be more well-directed.
Simply speaking, for a kind of attack that is almost impossible
to launch, there is no need to design an sophisticated defence
strategy along with degradation of the normal performance.
The proposed learning scheme in this work can fill this gap.
Specificly, it leverages the basic sampling methods to obtain
the realtime motion information of a mobile robot. Based on
that, the attacker needs to stay still and disguise as an obstacle.
When the mobile robot encounters the disguised attacker, it
will adjust its trajectory to avoid collision. This process will
be utilized and observed by the attacker and the data is used
to regress the obstacle-avoidance model by learning methods.
Next, the proposed attack involves designing sophisticated
attack strategies to achieve the specific purpose, where the
attacker disguises as an obstacle to fool the mobile robot into a
preset trap (the trap could be a pothole, a cage or an area where
the communication is invalid). Note that path distance and
transition time are two commonly-used optimization objective
in robot navigation (path planning) [17]. And it’s a variational
calculus problem to find the exact trajectory in an obstacle
field, and the analytic solution can only be obtained for some
simplest cases [18]. Furthermore, the learned model in last
step is basically impossible to be used for reversely computing
inputs given outputs. To tackle this issue, we first formulate
the attack design as a control optimization problem, where the
objective is minimize the path cost or time cost. Drawing on
the ideas similar to sampling-based approach [19], [20], we
propose near-shortest path and hands-off attack algorithms for
different requirements to solve the problems, respectively. The
key point is to make use of the nature of obstacle-avoidance
that once an obstacle is detected, the mobile robot will deviate
its trajectory towards opposite directions. When the mobile
robot is close enough to the trap, we mean the attack is
successful.
Fig. 1. The architecture of the learning-based intelligent attack
It should be mentioned that there are generally two kinds
of mobile robots: holonomic and non-holonomic. The latter
one appears more common in daily life, however, their in-
stantaneous movement is restricted [21], making the control
more challenging than that of holonomic mobile robots. The
proposed framework applies to both of the two kinds of mobile
robots. We mainly illustrate our work on non-holonomic robots
which is more difficult, and the work can be easily transfered
to holonomic robots due to their more simple motion char-
acteristic. Thus, the attack against holonomic robots will be
briefly introduced.
This paper is an extension of the preliminary work presented
in [22], providing a detailed and rigorous treatment of model
learning, performances guarantees, and significant novel simu-
lation results. Our study provides new insights into the security
issues for mobile robots. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time to
consider a physical-based and sophisticated attack against
mobile robots without any prior information of the system
dynamics for an attacker.
• We propose an intelligent attack framework for the at-
tacker. It can learn the obstacle detection area of a robot
through trial and observation. By the collected data and
learning methods, the obstacle-avoidance mechanism is
regressed. Both the holonomic and non-holonomic mobile
robots are considered.
• We design two kinds of attack strategies meeting different
purposes, such that the victim robot moves into the
preset trap area. The algorithm performance is analyzed
in terms of the optimality and time complexity of the
solution. Moreover, the condition for successful attack is
obtained. Extensive simulations are conducted to illustrate
effectiveness of the proposed approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the basics about the kinematics and obstacle-avoidance of mo-
bile robots are introduced. The control methods for holonomic
and non-holonomic are both considered. The learning scheme
for obstacle-avoidance mechanism is proposed in Section III.
Section IV presents the attack strategies with performance
analysis. Relative simulation results are shown in Section V.
Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce some basics about the
kinematics of a mobile robot. The motion dynamics of both
holonomic and non-holonomic mobile robots are presented.
Following this, we show what an important role the obstacle
avoidance palys for a mobile robot, and briefly introduce two
classical algorithms, artificial potential approach and dynamic
window approach. At last, our problem of interest is formu-
lated.
A. Motion Control for Mobile Robot
In 2-D plane, the posture of a mobile robot is usually
represented by its position (x, y) and orientation θ, denoted
as p = [x, y, θ]. Considering the constraints imposed on the
mobile robots, these robots are generally divided into two
categories: non-holonomic and holonomic. For non-holonomic
mobile robots (car-like wheeled mobile agents, unicycles, etc.),
they are subject to pure rolling constraints without sliding
between the wheel and the ground, which means the robots
cannot move laterally and the motion direction is consistent
with its instantaneous orientation at any time. The motion
of this robots is controlled directly by linear velocity v and
angular velocity ω or velocities of two driving wheels, which
are equivalent with each other. The kinematics is modeled by
a group of non-linear ordinary differential equations (ODEs),
whose discrete forms are given by
x(tci ) = x(t
c
i−1) + v(t
c
i−1) · cos(θ(tci−1)) · T,
y(tci ) = y(t
c
i−1) + v(t
c
i−1) · sin(θ(tci−1)) · T,
θ(tci ) = θ(t
c
i−1) + ω(t
c
i−1) · T,
(1)
where T is the motion control period, i (i = 1, 2, · · · ) denotes
the motion control time instant tci with t
c
i − tci−1 = T , θ ∈ [0, 2pi)
is the orientation respect to the x axis, v and ω are the linear
and angular velocity, respectively. As for holonomic mobile
robots, their kinematics in two directions is independent with
each other and is formulated as the following discrete first-
dynamics:  x(tci ) = x(tci−1) + vx(tci−1) · T,y(tci ) = y(tci−1) + vy(tci−1) · T, (2)
where vx and vy are velocities along X and Y axis directions,
respectively. Since the motion of holonomic robot is the
composition of the motions of two directions, the orientation
is usually neglected.
The aim of motion control is to design the velocities in
(1) and (2) according to different task requirements. As in
[23], a “hand” position of non-holonomic robot is defined as
h = (xh, yh), which lies a distance L from the center p along
robot’s axis of orientation. By simple transformation, we have[
x˙h
y˙h
]
=
[
cos θ −L sin θ
sin θ L cos θ
] [
v
ω
]
. (3)
The kinematics of the hand position is holonomic for L , 0.
In this way, the control problem is simplified and sufficient
for the purpose of this paper, and we obtain[
v
ω
]
=
[
cos θ sin θ
− 1L sin θ 1L cos θ
] [
ux
uy
]
, (4)
where ux, uy are the velocity control inputs in two directions.
For holonomic robots, their motion control is directly formu-
lated as vx = ux, vy = uy.
For simplicity of expression, we denote the motion dynam-
ics of all robots as
p(i + 1) = p(i) + u(i) · T, (5)
where u(i) is generalized velocity control vector at time tci .
In the following sections, we will propose an intelligent
attack scheme that can be applied to both two kinds of robots,
making our attack generic in practice.
B. Obstacle-avoidance Algorithm
Numerous obstacle-avoidance algorithms have been devel-
oped in the literature, for example, potential fields based
approach [24]–[26], genetic algorithm based approach [27]–
[29], fuzzy logic based approach [30]–[32], neural network
based approach [33]–[35], etc. According to characteristic of
obstacle-avoidance mechanism that commonly used, similar
to [36], we divide these algorithms into two types: instantly-
deterministic (e.g, artificial potential method, learning-based
method) and long-horizon exploring (dynamic window ap-
proach, genetic approach, evolutionary algorithm). The former
one can be seen as determined-model driven, i.e, the solution
of current obstacle-avoidance is unique (although learning-
based method is commonly said data-driven, the model is gen-
erally injective mapping once the training process is complete).
The key idea of the latter one is to search for feasible solutions
in the solution space. And there is usually an evaluation
function to select the best one, due to the multiplicity of
solutions. In this paper, a representative method of each kind
is used, i.e,, the classic artificial potential method (APM) and
dynamic window approach (DWA).
APF is first presented in [24]. The basic idea is that when
a robot detects an obstacle, it produces a repulsive potential
field, with the artificial force acting in the negative direction
of the potential gradient. Denote ρ(p1, p2) = ‖p1 − p2‖2 as the
distance between two points. The algorithm is given by
urep=
 krep
(
1
ρ(p,pobs)
− 1
ρ0
) ∇ρ(p,pobs)
ρ2(p,pobs)
, if ρ(p, pobs)≤ρ0;
0 , if ρ(p, pobs)>ρ0,
(6)
where p and pobs are the coordinates of the robot and obstacle,
respectively.
Regarding uattr = [ux, uy]T as attraction force term, we
combine urep with uattr to achieve robot motion control with
obstacle-avoidance. Then, we have
u f inal = uattr + urep, (7)
where u f inal represents the final input of the robot.
Remark 1: Since the independent motion of two directions
matches well with the control designs of APM, APM is quite
convenient to be applied to holonomic mobile robots. A major
drawback of APM is the local minima problem, and a easy
solution is to add a random disturbance. However, there is
no need to deal with this issue in this paper, for the obstacle
disguised by the attacker is not always static.
DWA is a velocity space based approach and is commonly
used in Robot Operating System (ROS). The robot first
samples multiple groups of feasible velocity inputs from the
velocity space (v, ω), which is used to simulate following
trajectories. Then the robot evaluates these trajectories and
choose the first step velocity input of the best trajectory
to actuate the movement. The key point of this approach
is to design the sampling intervals of velocity space and
the evaluation function. Specifically, an evaluation function
F(v, ω)is to select a heading and velocity that drives the robot
to the goal with the maximum clearance from obstacles, given
by
F(v, ω) = β1 · heading(v, ω) + β2 · dist(v, ω) + β2 · velocity(v, ω),
(8)
where heading(v, ω) is the angular deviation between robot’s
orientation and the goal, dist(v, ω) is distance between the
robot and its closest obstacle, and velocity(v, ω) is exactly the
velocity inputs of current trajectory. All of the three variables
are normalized for unified evaluation, and the constans βi (i =
1, 2, 3) determine the contribution of each factor. For more
details, readers are referred to [37] and [38].
Remark 2: Due to the direct sampling from the velocity
space (v, ω), DWA is easy and straightforward to be applied to
non-holonomic mobile robots. A drawback of this approach is
the computation may be cumbersome, introduced by multiple
velocity samplings and trajectory evaluations.
C. Problem of Interest
Our research is based on a simple yet quite representative
scenario in most applications of mobile robot: a robot (or
robots) is performing a go-to-goal task based on certain motion
control algorithm. During this process, the robot is able to
avoid obstacles occurring in its surroundings. And there is an
attacker nearby, whose attack purpose is two-fold: learn the
obstacle-avoidance mechanism of the victim robot, and design
an efficient attack strategy to fool it to move into a preset trap.
To achieve that, there are manly three challenges that need
to be tackled: i) without any prior information for the motion
dynamics of a mobile robot, what information is necessary for
the attacker and how to obtain them; ii) what kind of feasible
attack can be launched based on these information; iii) how
to evaluate the attack performance and optimize the attack
strategy. The whole framework of this paper is shown in Fig. 1
Hereafter, we denote the attacker as Ra and the victim mobile
robot as Rv. The following assumptions hold throughout this
paper.
Assumption 1: Ra can move faster than Rv, and has strong
ability to sense objects. The observation by Ra is noise-free.
Assumption 2: Rv’s movement is regular, i.e., it can be
modeled by a function of time explicitly, which is continuous
everywhere and indifferentiable in finite points.
III. LEARNING SCHEME FOR OBSTACLE-AVOIDANCE
MECHANISM
When Ra encounters an obstacle within its detection area, it
will evaluate the obstacle’s influence and take corresponding
action, deviating from its desired trajectory. Inspired by this,
a learning scheme for the obstacle-avoidance mechanism is
proposed. This scheme consists of three parts:
• Pre-sampling. Ideally, the instantaneous motion infor-
mation of Rv (such as orientation, linear, angular and
acceleration velocities) can be obtained based on three
consecutive position samplings. This constitutes the cor-
nerstone following steps.
• Intentional learning. With the ability of mastering Rv’s
motion information, Ra seeks to make certain influence
by approaching Rv and then observes its reaction. By a
sequence of trials, Rv’s detection area and goal position
can be inferred.
• Model regression. Through multiple observations of Rv’s
reaction of avoiding obstacles, such as position and bear-
ing variation, Ra obtains a collection of data. Then, Ra
utilize it to regress a model that captures the obstacle-
avoidance by learning-based method (e.g., SVR).
A. Pre-sampling: Data Acquisition
Recalling that the posture p of an mobile robot is updated
every periodic control time T , its trajectory during the period
T can be approximated as a straight line. Equipped with ad-
vanced sensors, Ra is able to measure its relative displacement
with a moving object. Supposing the sampling period of Ra is
T˜ = NT , for simplicity of notation, we use the subscript k to
represent the sampling time tsk with t
s
k − tsk−1 = T˜ .
After three consecutive sampling moments, the instanta-
neous variables of Rv’s motion are estimated by
vx,k+1 =
xk+1 − xk
T˜
, vy,k+1 =
yk+1 − yk
T˜
,
vk+1 =
√
v2x,k+1 + v
2
y,k+1, θk+1 = arctan
vy,k+1
vx,k+1
,
ak+1 =
vk+1 − vk
T˜
, ωk+1 =
θk+1 − θk
T˜
,
(9)
where v,w, a represent the linear, angular and accelerated
velocities, respectively. To make (9) completely available, the
sampling period needs to be small enough (e.g, 10ms) and Rv
always has the last three groups of data stored to calculate
(9). For holonomic mobile robots, this process is much easier
with higher precision and we can directly utilize vx, vy. To
make a unified statement, let v1 = v, v2 = ω if the robot is
non-holonomic or v1 =vx, v2 =vy if holonomic.
Remark 3: Generally, the motion control period T is very
small (e.g., 0.5s or 0.1s), and the sampling period is deter-
mined by the information sensing and processing ability T˜ of
Ra. Concerning how to choose an appropriate T˜ , we assume
it keeps the minimum sampling time that Ra could afford.
Ideally, we have T˜ = T .
Based on (9), Ra can master Rv’s instantaneous motion in-
formation of any time. This constitutes the foundation of the
following steps.
Dα
Rv Ra
Detecting 'obstacle' 
halfway
∆s
∆θ
Goal 
Position
Detection area (D,α) Adjusting for period  T
Normally running 
towards goal
Desired trajectory 
without obstacles
~
Fig. 2. Ra’s reaction after detecting Rv as an obstacle.
Rv Ra
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∆θ¹0
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Goal 
Position
Detecting obstacle 
adjust trajectory
(a) Learning Rv’s detection radius D.
Rv
Ra
α1
D
∆θ¹0
Track2
Detecting obstacle 
adjust trajectory
Goal 
Position
(b) Learning Rv’s detection ang α1.
Fig. 3. Illustration of the (D,α) learning process for Rv.
B. Intentional-learning: Trajectory Trial
For the obstacle detection area of Ra, it can be generalized to
a circular region mostly. If we do not consider obstacles behind
it during its moving forward, the detection area is modeled as
a sector directly. Then, at this stage, the primary objective of
Ra is to infer the radius D and angle range α of the sector,
which are together denoted as (D,α).
When Ra moves close to Rv, Ra makes a record of Rv’s
relative position, heading and bearing with it. After a period
T˜ , Ra does the measurement again. With the two readings,
Ra is able to calculate Rv’s position variation ∆s and heading
variation ∆θ after T˜ . During time slot [tsk, t
s
k+1], we have
∆s(i) =
√
(∆xk,k+1)2 + (∆yk,k+1)2,
∆θ(i) = arctan
∆yk,k+1
∆xk,k+1
,
(10)
where ∆xk,k+1 = x(tsk + T˜ ) − x(tsk) and ∆yk,k+1 =y(tsk + T˜ ) − y(tsk).
Note that in normal situations, Rv goes straight forward to the
goal, i.e., ∆θ= 0. Therefore, we assume Ra is detected as an
obstacle within (D,α) by Rv if ∆θ , 0. This whole process is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
During the (D,α) learning process of Rv, it also records
the trajectories of moving towards to the goal, as shown in
Fig. 3. Denote these trajectories as track( j) ( j = 1, 2, · · · ,M),
which are segments of straight lines leading to the goal. Let
dT (track( j), p) be the minimal distance from a position p to
Algorithm 1 Learning Rv’s Detection Area and Goal
Input: Rv’s posture pv, posture regulating variables ∆d, ∆α for
every trial
Output: detection area (D,α) and goal position pgoal
1: Initialize: Ra moves to remote posture pa such that Ra is directly
ahead of Rv, i.e. ϕr=0;
2: while ∆θ = 0 do
3: d = d − ∆d;
4: Pa = Pa + d;
5: Calculate ∆θ ;
6: if ∆θ , 0 then
7: Record D, and the following trajectory as track[1];
8: end if
9: end while
10: Reset: Ra moves to a posture pa such that Ra is in Rv’s +90◦
direction with distance = D, i.e., α1 = θ + 90◦;
11: while ∆θ = 0 do
12: α1 = α1 − ∆α;
13: Calculate ∆θ;
14: if ∆θ , 0 then
15: Record α1, and the following trajectory as track[2];
16: end if
17: end while
18: Reset: Ra moves to another posture p′a such that Ra is in Rv’s−90◦ direction with distance = D, i.e., α2 = θ − 90◦. Then Ra
does the same process again to obtain a new α2 and track[3];
19: α = [α2, α1], compute goal using the trajectories;
20: Return (D,α) and goal position
track( j), and pˆgoal be the estimated goal by Rv. Then, the
estimation error of pˆgoal is given by
εpˆgoal = (1/M)
∑M
j=1
d2T (track[ j], pˆgoal), (11)
where M is the number of recorded trajectories. Then, the
problem is formulated as
A¯pgoal = b, (12)
where A¯ ∈ RM×2,b¯ ∈ RM×1 and pgoal ∈ R2×1 is the coordinates
in X-Y plane. Apparently (12) is an overdetermined equation
problem, which has an exact solution only when the measure-
ments are totally accurate. Thus, we can only obtain the least
square solution pˆgoal of (12).
Assuming dT (track, pˆgoal) satisfies E
(
dT (track, pˆgoal)
)
=
0,D
(
dT (track, pˆgoal)
)
= σ2T , we have
lim
M→∞(1/M)
∑M
i=1
d2T (track[i], pˆgoal) = σ
2
T . (13)
Since the real goal is generally a region, which is specified
by maximum radius rg  σT , we take the estimated pˆgoal
as acceptable if εpˆgoal ≤ r2g. Here we set M = 3, which
basically satisfies the requirements (if not, we only need to set
more groups of the sampling trajectories). The whole steps of
intentional learning is summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. Obstacle-avoidance Mechanism Regression
Next, Ra can move inside (D,α) of one agent. In this step,
Ra also records its relative distance dr and bearing ϕr with Rv,
and Rv’s heading deviation θ′ with the goal point. Once Ra is
detected, it stores two groups of data during the next period
T˜ . The data groups are defined as Qin(k) = [θ′(k), v1(k), v2(k), a(k), dr(k), ϕr(k)],Qout(k) = [∆s(k),∆θ(k)]. (14)
Furthermore, the reaction velocity input uv(k) is obtained by
output(k)/T˜ . Next, we define the sampled feasible set M as
M =
{
∪
k∈F
{Qin(k),Qout(k)}
}
, (15)
where F = {k ∈ Z+ : dr(k) ≤ D, ϕr(k) ∈ α}. Then, we propose
Algorithm 2, by which Ra collects the data setM and uses it as
training data to learn the obstacle-avoidance mechanism of Rv.
Note timer limit is the preset trial limit for Ra. Specifically,
the classic support vector regression (SVR) method is used.
Remark 4: SVR method has good performance on non-
linear regression and strong generalization ability when the
amount of data isn’t vast. It is insensitive to the model of
learning object and has certain tolerance for data noises, due
to the error-tube design [39].
Now we give a detailed analysis for this algorithm. Con-
sidering tsk = t
c
i in the beginning of time slot T˜ = NT , we
have
xk+1−xk =∆xk,k+1 =
∑N−1
j=0
v(tci+ j) · T · cos θ(tci+ j),
yk+1−yk =∆yk,k+1 =
∑N−1
j=0
v(tci+ j) · T · sin θ(tci+ j),
θk+1−θk =∆θk,k+1 =
∑N−1
j=0
ω(tci+ j) · T ,
(16)
where v(tci+ j) and ω(t
c
i+ j) are determined by (4).
As mentioned in Remark 3, the sampling period T˜ does
not equal to the control period T necessarily, due to the
limitation of sampling and computation ability of Ra. Under
this circumstance, only a group of real control velocities during
the T˜ is able to be used. Then, the accurate model (16) is
changed into a approximate form, given by
xk+1 − xk ≈ ∆xˆk,k+1 = NT · v(tci ) · cos θ(tci ),
yk+1 − yk ≈ ∆yˆk,k+1 = NT · v(tci ) · sin θ(tci ),
θk+1 − θk ≈ ∆θˆk,k+1 = NT · ω(tci ).
(17)
Simplifying (17), we obtain ∆dˆk,k+1 =
√
(∆xˆk,k+1)2 + (∆yˆk,k+1)2 = NT · v(tci ),
∆θˆk,k+1 = NT · ω(tci ),
(18)
where ∆dˆk,k+1 and ∆θˆk,k+1 represents the displacement and
bearing variation in every sampling period, respectively.
Essentially, the learning method is applied to regress the
mapping relationship between input and output. There exit
inevitable model errors using (18). Ignoring the subscripts,
let q = [∆x,∆y,∆θ]′ and qˆ = [∆xˆ,∆yˆ,∆θˆ]′, the following
probability is presented to describe the learning effects, given
by
P {‖q − qˆ‖ ≤ g} ≥ 1 − ε(g), (19)
Algorithm 2 Regress Obstacle-avoidance Mechanism
Input: Ra’s detection area (D,α), intentional-learning’s
timer limit, M = ∅
Output: Obstacle-avoidance mechanism f
1: Initialize: Ra moves to a relatively far position from Rv
2: for k ← 1 to timer limit do
3: Ra moves into a random position in (D,α);
4: Compute Qin = θ′(k), v1(k), v2(k), a(k), dr(k), ϕr(k)] at tsk;
5: Wait for a time slot T˜
6: Compute Qout = [∆s(k),∆θ(k)] at tsk+1;
7: M =M∪ {Qin,Qout};
8: end for
9: Use M and learning-based method (e.g, SVR) to regress f ;
10: Return f
where g is the error between real value and estimated value,
and 1 − ε(g) represents the confidence we have in qˆ. ε(g) is a
monotonically increasing function of g, determined by specific
learning model and ranging from 0 to 1. The smaller g is, the
more reliable qˆ is. Naturally, we have
lim
T˜→T
P
[‖q − qˆ‖ = 0] = 1. (20)
Remark 5: Given a group of normal inputs, the output of
the learned model is inevitably with certain noise, which is
determined by the nature of learning methods. Besides, it
is easy to understand that the learned model is a mapping
from input to output, however, the model is not necessarily a
surjection or injective mapping. In other words, the model
cannot be inversely used to obtain input given a group of
outputs in most cases.
Now that the obstacle-avoidance mechanism of Rv is known
to Ra, it fills the gap between the powerful assumption (where
the attacker has known the information of the target system
from the very beginning), and the real implementation (where
the attacker needs to acquire those necessary information first).
IV. INTELLIGENT ATTACK STRATEGY
A. Attack Feasibility Analysis
By above learning scheme, Ra has found a way to master
the obstacle-avoidance mechanism. Based on this, we design
an intelligent attack strategy, which aims to fool the mobile
robot into the preset trap. The feasibility of the attack lies in
two parts. First, the proposed attack is launched from physical
world by disguising Ra as an obstacle, and there is no way
for Rv to evade its influence. Second, Ra’s presence is taken
into consideration by Rv’s obstacle-avoidance mechanism, and
the learning scheme proposed in last section provides solid
information foundation for Rv to implement more smart and
stealthy attack.
However, these points do not indicate the attack design is
simple. In fact, unlike traditional control design, it is a quite
knotty problem because it involves two independent motion
dynamics of Ra and Rv, and we need to take the mutual
influence of two dynamics into consideration when designing
the strategies. This implicates that many powerful analytical
tools in control field may not work well in this scenario. To
better tackle this problem, we propose two kinds of attack
strategies considering the cost of Rv and Ra, respectively. In
most situations, the solutions of the optimized strategies are
often greedy and rarely provide performance guarantees. In
this paper, under bounded noise assumptions, we provide a
kind of optimal attack strategy that is deterministic. The attack
performance is further analyzed.
Next, we give some notations that are commonly used in
following section. Let the sector detection area of Rv at time
period kT˜ be DA(pv(k)), and rd-domain of a position p as
Nd(p, rd) =
{
p′ :
∥∥∥p′ − p∥∥∥2 < rd} , (21)
where rd is a user-specified small constant. Regardless of the
type of mobile robots, the motion updates of Rv and Ra are
denoted as
pv(k + 1) = pv(k) + uv(k) · T˜ , (22)
pa(k + 1) = pa(k) + ua(k) · T˜ , (23)
where uv(k) is the velocity control input of Rv and ua(k) is
attack input of Ra. With learned model f , Ra can predict Rv’s
velocity input, given by
uˆv(k) = f (pa(k), pv(k), uv(k − 1)). (24)
Note the quality of the prediction cannot be guaranteed totally
accurate, and in this paper we consider the prediction is
associated with certain noises, formulated as
uˆv(k) = uv(k) + ς(k), (25)
where ς(k) denotes the motion-state-dependent prediction
noise at time kT˜ , and is assumed normally distributed as
ς(k) ∼ N(0,Σk). And (24) is further used to infer Rv’s posture
of next time, i.e.,
pˆv(k + 1) = pv(k) + uˆv(k) · T˜ . (26)
B. Shortest-path Attack
From the perspective of path cost, we define the optimal
trajectory in the sense that the trajectory length, from the
position where Rv is attacked for the first time (denoted as pa0 )
to the preset trap, is shortest. We formulate it as the following
L2-optimal control problem.
Problem 1: Given the initial configuration of 1) the preset
trap; 2) the goal position of Ra; 3) the initial attack position
pa0 , our goal is to select a horizon H and find control inputs
ua(t) for all time instants t ∈ {0, · · · , F}, that solve the
following control problem
min
H,ua,0:H
Cs(ua,0:H) =
∑H
t=0
‖pˆv(t + 1) − pv(t)‖2, (27a)
s.t. ‖ua(t)‖2 ≤ σ, (27b)∥∥∥pv(H) − ptrap∥∥∥2 ≤ δ, (27c)
η ≤ ‖pa(t) − pv(t)‖2, (27d)
pa(t) ∈ DA(pv(t)), (27e)
(22), (23), (24), and (26),
where the constraints hold for ∀t ∈ {0, · · · , F}.
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In (27a), u0:H stands for the sequence of control inputs
applied from t = 0 to t = H. Essentially, it is to minimize
the accumulated uncertainty brought by the learned regression
model. The first constraint (27b) requires the attack inputs
to be bounded by a constant σ. The second constraint (27c)
guarantees that Rv will move into the trap when the attack
stops. The η in (27d) is designed to keep a safe distance
between Ra and Rv during the attack, avoiding possible
collision at next-step movement. And (27e) makes sure Ra
always in the detection area during the attack. The last four
constraints capture the state dynamics of Ra and Rv.
Ideally, we can directly obtain the ideal trajectory Tra∗ by
connecting the position pa0 and trap position. However, Tra
∗ is
almost impossible to be real optimal trajectory, because some
constraints of mechanical structure and control dynamics will
not allow Rv to be in the desired position. Even so, we are
able to utilize Tra∗ as evaluation criteria: the closer the real
trajectory is with Tra∗, the better the attack strategy is. Then
comes an interesting problem: how to choose the best pa0 to
begin attacking, which we call entry point.
Let LT be an indicative function of a trajectory Tr, satisfying
LT (p,Tr) =
{
0, i f p ∈ Tr;
±1, i f p < Tr. (28)
Then, the definition of entry point is given as follows.
Definition 1: (Entry point) Given the initial position pv(0),
goal position pgoal of Rv, and preset trap ptrap, denote the
trajectory from pv(0) to pgoal without being attacked as lT .
Based on lT , rebuild a coordinate frame X’-Y’ where the Y’
positive axis are at a angle of 45◦ to lT . Divide the X-Y plane
into 4 parts using dash line (as shown in Fig. 4). Then, the
entry point is defined as follows
(i) If ptrap ∈ S 1, pe is the vertical projection of ptrap onto
lT , i.e,
pe = arg min
p′
∥∥∥p′ − ptrap∥∥∥2, (29)
where p′ ∈ {p : LT (p, lT ) = 0}.
(ii) If ptrap ∈ S 2, there is no exact position of pe. Under
given constraints, the easier to attack, the better.
(iii) If ptrap ∈ S 3, there is no exact position of pe. Under
given constraints, the later to attack, the better.
(iv) If ptrap ∈ S 4, pe is the projection of ptrap along X’ or Y’
direction onto lT .
During Rv’s movement towards pgoal, if at some time period
kT , pe ∈ Nd(pv(k), rd) holds for the first time, set as = k. Then
Ra begins attacking by moving to its initial attack position
pa(as + 1), which satisfies pa(as + 1)∈DA(pv(as)),LT (pa(as + 1), lT )·LT (ptrap, lT ) < 0. (30)
Note the second condition in (30) requires the initial attack
position and ptrap are in opposite positions of lT .
Since the intentional learning and attack process are sep-
arated, i.e., there is no direct feedback between the two
parts. And due to the black-box characteristic of the learned
model, obtaining a optimally global analytical solution for
the problem is intractable. Even if a global optimal solution
can be found off-line by using exhaustive search (e.g, depth-
first search or breadth-first search), the optimality cannot be
guaranteed. This is determined by the regressed outputs with
certain noise, and the noises of every moment during the
attack will be cumulated without being considered, which
makes uncontrollable gap between real and desired attack
results. Therefore, we propose a sampling-based approach and
find sub-optimal solutions quickly, the complete process is
summarized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 is composed of three parts: i) First, before Rv
comes near to pe, Ra needs to wait for the best attack time
[Line 17-21]; ii) Then, after Ra begins its initial attack, every
iteration of following attacks are based on sampling to explore
the motion space of both Ra and Rv and select a best attack
input from a feasible attack set [Line 6-16]; iii) In the end,
when Rv is close enough from ptrap, Ra stops and we call the
attack is successful. The bottleneck of Algorithm 3 is that the
sampling set can be large such that the total computation is
time-consuming [Line 8-14]. Also, there is a tedious need to
check whether the constraints are satisfied is every iteration
[Line 7 and 15].
C. Performance Guarantees
In this section, the existence of optimal solution of Problem
1 is proved, then we provide performance guarantees of the
solution by Algorithm 3, with respect to the optimal solution.
First, we claim the following statement:
Definition 2: (ε-Equivalent solution) Given a sufficient
small constant ε, if there are two groups of solutions uia,0:H and
u ja,0:H of Problem 1, such that
∥∥∥∥uia,0:H − u ja,0:H∥∥∥∥2 is smaller than
ε, then we call the two solutions are ε-equivalent solutions.
This definition provides a criteria to judge the similarity of
two solutions. In the following, if two solutions satisfy the
ε-equivalent, we directly treat them as equal.
Theorem 1: For Problem 1, there must exist a choice of
ua,0:H such that the associated cost by (27a) is minimal.
Proof 1: In essence, the motion control of mobile robot
is in discrete form, therefore we consider formulating the
problem using breadth traversal analysis. All the solutions of
Algorithm 3 Shortest-path Attack Strategy
Input: (i) maximum number of iterations kmax;
(ii) dynamics, learned obstacle-avoidance mechanism f ;
(iii) Termination error bound δ
Output: Terminal horizon H, and attack input vector ua,0:H ;
1: Initialize pv(0), pgoal, ptrap, and set the attack signal as = 0;
2: Compute entry point pe by (29);
3: Randomly select a feasible position from Nd(pe, rd) as waiting
position pa(0) before attacking;
4: Rv starts to run towards pgoal;
5: for k ← 1 to kmax do
6: if as ≥ 1 then
7: Sample a feasible subset Pranda from DA(pv(k));
8: for pa(k + 1) ∈ Pranda do
9: Compute pˆv(k + 1) by (26);
10: Compute the distance from Rv to trap by dˆ(k + 1) =∥∥∥ pˆv(k + 1) − ptrap∥∥∥2;
11: if dˆ(k + 1)≤d(k) and pa(k)∈DA(pv(k)) then
12: Update P fa = P
f
a ∪ {pa(k + 1)};
13: end if
14: end for
15: k′ = k − as, and select current attack input ua(k′) =
arg
ua
min{∥∥∥ pˆv(k + 1) − ptrap∥∥∥2 : pa(k + 1) ∈ P fa , (27b) and
(27d) hold };
16: end if
17: if as = 0 and pv ∈ Nd(pe, rd) then
18: Ra moves into the pre-attack position, as = k;
19: else
20: Ra stays still;
21: end if
22: if
∥∥∥pv(k) − ptrap∥∥∥2 < δ then
23: break;
24: end if
25: end for
26: H = k′, and construct attack input vector ua,0:H ;
the problem are represented by a tree, where the initial attack
position pa(as + 1) is the root node and a node in floor k′
denotes the attack inputs at attack iteration k′.
Based on (27b), multiple attack inputs from {ua, ‖ua(k′)‖2 ≤
σ} at attack step k′ are sampled. Suppose the number of
sampling groups is n, for every two adjacent node uia(k
′)
and uia(k
′), the deviation
∥∥∥uia(k′) − ui−1a (k′)∥∥∥ is the same. Then,
we define the sub-node set of ua(k′) as S n(ua(k′)), with
card{S n(ua(k′))} = n. Due to the constraint (27d), Ra can not
stay unmoved all the time. Besides, at iteration k, the distance
d(k) =
∥∥∥ pˆv(k + 1) − ptrap∥∥∥2 must be smaller than d(k − 1). As
a consequence of the two factors, it is deduced that the length
H of ua,0:H is finite. Denote the maximum attack depth as H¯
and construct a solution as
u˜a,0:H = {u˜a(1), u˜a(2), · · · , u˜a(H)} ,
where u˜a(k′ + 1) ∈ S n(ua(k′)), k′ = 1, 2, · · · ,H − 1. By the
constraints (27d) and (27e), many sub-nodes of a node ua(k′)
are excluded in Algorithm 3. Therefore, the total number of
all feasible solutions, n f , is far smaller than nH¯ .
Given a sampling size n, let u˜∗,na,0:H be the best solution
among n f feasible solutions, and it is intuitive to have
Cs(u˜∗,n+1a,0:H ) ≤ Cs(u˜∗,na,0:H).
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Fig. 5. Shortest-path attack against non-holonomic robot with DWA. (a) Illustrations of four special attack positions pi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. (b) Attack pattern1: a
circular arc plus a line segment. (c) Attack pattern2: two circular arcs plus a line segment.
By the ε-equivalence of solutions, when n is large enough,
the cost Cs of different best solutions (of different n) will not
change. Thus, the optimal solution is obtained (not necessarily
unique). The proof is completed.
Next, we will investigate how good the solution of Al-
gorithm 3 is. As we mentioned before, for non-holonomic
robot, the output is the linear velocity and angular velocity,
respectively. Since the relationship between the two velocities
and the radius of curvature is deterministic (i.e, v = ωr), for
simplicity, we use 2-tuple (ω, r) to illustrate the visual effect.
As shown in Fig. 5(a), supposing the trap is at the left side
of Rv, denote four extreme positions {p1, p2, p3, p4} where Ra
could be to make the attack take effect. And the corresponding
output is {(ωi, ri), i = 1, · · · , 4}. Note that Rv’s reaction against
Ra of four positions can be sorted as r1 < r2 < r4 < r3, i,e,
p1 is the most threatening position for Ra while p3 the least
threatening. Denote rmax = max {ri} and rmin = min {ri}.
Assumption 3: In this section, a trap (in S 1) whose distance
to lT is less than (
√
3 + 1)rmin is considered by Algorithm 3.
The reason lies in that there is no need to design specific attack
strategies with these traps, and the attacker only need to begin
attacking a little earlier before the entry point.
Lemma 1: Suppose the reaction radius is r, and consider
an attack pattern of Ra where r keeps unchanged. Denote the
length of Ra’s trajectory of being attacked, then we have
(pi/2+φ−cos φ)r+Ld cos φ ≤ lpath ≤ (76pi−1−
√
3)r+Ld, (31)
where φ = arcsin
(
r
Ld−r
)
.
Proof 2: First, consider that Ra attacks Rv by being at the
same relative position with it. This process continues until the
orientation of Rv is heading towards the trap, the path length
of this process is denoted as lpath1. Then Ra moves along with
Rv such that Rv goes straightforward to the trap. The path
length is of this process is lpath2. The pattern is represented
by Pattern 1, shown in Fig. 5(b) And the angle between the
second line and Tra∗ is
φ = arcsin
(
r
Ld − r
)
. (32)
By the calculation formula for arc length, we obtain lpathA1 =
(pi/2 + φ)r, and lpathA2 = (Ld − r)cosφ. Then we have
lpathA = (pi/2 + φ − cos φ)r + Ld cos φ. (33)
Next, consider another attack pattern such that Rv moves
two circular arc and the end is tangent to the line Tra∗. The
pattern is represented by Pattern 2, shown in Fig. 5(c). By the
geometrical representation, the length of arc part Rv passed
is computed as 76pir, and the length of straight line part is
Ld − (1 +
√
3)r. Then, we obtain
lpathB = (
7
6
pi − 1 − √3)r + Ld. (34)
Note that Ld > (
√
3 + 1)r and 0 < φ < arcsin
√
3
3 , then
lpathB − lpathA = (2pi3 − 1 −
√
3 − φ + cos φ)r + Ld(1 − cos φ)
≥ (2pi
3
− φ − √3 cos φ)r > 0.16r > 0. (35)
(35) implicates lpathB is always larger than lpathA. In fact, if the
reaction radius of Rv is unchanged, the length of Rv’s path is
bounded by lpathA and lpathB. The proof is completed.
Theorem 2: When pe ∈ S 1, let Ld be the distance between
the trap and the best entry point, J¯ and J∗ be the solution
obtained by Algorithm 3 and the optimal solution of Problem
1, respectively. For Ld>2 · rmin, we have
(pi/2+φ−cos φ)rmin +Ld(cos φ−1)≤ J¯− J∗≤ (76pi−1−
√
3)rmax,
(36)
where φ = arcsin
(
rmin
Ld−rmin
)
.
Proof 3: By lemma 1, we know that given a r ∈ [rmin, rmax],
the path is bounded by (31). For the path length is monoton-
ically increasing with r increasing, we obtain the minimum
path length when r = rmin and the trajectory is Pattern 1.
and obtain the maximum path length when r = rmax and the
trajectory is Pattern 2.
By the design of Algorithm 3, even though the reaction
radius of Rv is time-varying, it is also bounded in [rmin, rmax].
Then it can be induced that the real path length is between
the minimum and the maximum path length.
Since J∗ = Ld, we have (pi/2+φ−cos φ)rmin +Ld(cos φ−1)≤
J¯ − J∗≤ ( 76pi − 1 −
√
3)rmax, the proof is completed.
With the feasibility of the attack is guaranteed, Theorem 2
indicates in most situations, how close the solution obtained by
Algorithm 3 is to ideal trajectory, and how the worst solution
could be, which is extremely hard to actually achieve.
D. Hands-off Attack
The attack approach developed in the previous subsections
can be used to fool Rv to run into the trap significantly
and efficiently. However, under this circumstance, Ra needs
to implement the attack consistently until Rv is in the trap,
which is not desirable in some situations. For example, long-
time obstacle occurrence may incur an alarm of Rv and even
make Rv alter a different control strategy. To alleviate those
consequences and make the attacker more stealthy, in this
section we introduce another attack strategy: hands-off attack.
In control society, “hands-off” means the control effort can be
maintained exactly zero over a time interval, and the hands-off
property means to the sparsest control among all admissible
controls or the minimal control interference with the plant
[40], [41]. Here we call Ra at a hands-off control state, if it
stands still at one moment in the attack process. Utilizing this
strategy, the attack will proceed even Ra is not active for the
moment. Therefore, the aim of hands-off attack is to fool Rv to
move into the trap, with the maximum hands-off state ratio for
Ra’s attack process. Mathematically, we formulate the attack
design as following problem.
Problem 2: Given the initial configuration of 1) the preset
trap; 2) the goal position of Ra; 3) the initial attack position,
our goal is to select a horizon H and find control inputs ua(t)
(t ∈ {0, · · · , F}), that solve the following control problem
min
H,ua,0:H
Ch(ua,0:H) =
∥∥∥ua,0:H∥∥∥0 (37a)
s.t. ‖ua(t)‖2 ≤ σ, (37b)∥∥∥pv(H) − ptrap∥∥∥2 ≤ δ, (37c)
η1 ≤ ‖pa(t) − pv(t)‖2 ≤ η2, (37d)
(22), (23), (24), and (26),
where the constraints hold ∀t ∈ {0, · · · , F}.
In this problem, (37a) depicts the goal to minimize the attack
times. Different from (27d) and (27e), (37d) can be seen as
their relaxation such that Ra does not have to be in the obstacle
detection area all the time. And other constraints are the same
with that of Problem 1.
Note that the feasibility of hands-off attack lies in the
intrinsic property of the obstacle-avoidance. Simply speaking,
if Ra stops moving, Rv will treat Ra as an ordinary obstacle and
move around it. This process is a tradeoff between avoiding
obstacle and going to goal, and there exists a certain timeline,
before which the obstacle-avoidance part plays a dominant role
and after which the go-to-goal does. The hands-off attack is
made by utilizing the former part and just letting Rv deviate the
ideal trajectory itself. However, Ra cannot stands still all the
time, and the major difficulty is how to maximize waiting time
Algorithm 4 Hands-off Attack Strategy
Input: (i) maximum number of iterations kmax;
(ii) dynamics, learned obstacle-avoidance mechanism f ;
(iii) Termination error bound δ, user-specified constant n;
Output: Terminal horizon H, and attack input vector ua,0:H ;
1: Initialize pv(0), pgoal, ptrap, and set the attack signal as = 0;
2: Compute entry point pe by (29);
3: Randomly select a feasible position from Nd(pe, rd) as waiting
position pa(0) before attacking;
4: Rv starts to run towards pgoal;
5: for k ← 1 to kmax do
6: d(k) =
∥∥∥pv(k) − ptrap∥∥∥2, k′ = k − as;
7: if as≥1 and d(k) > (1/n)
∥∥∥pe − ptrap∥∥∥2 then
8: if d(k) ≤ d(k − 1) and (37b), (37d) hold then
9: Ra stays still, i.e, ua(k′) = 0;
10: else
11: do the same procedure of [Line 7-15] of Algorithm 3
and obtain ua(k − as);
12: end if
13: else if as≥1 and d(k) ≤ (1/n)
∥∥∥pe − ptrap∥∥∥2 then
14: if dT (Lm(pv(k)), ptrap) < δ and (37b), (37d) hold then
15: Ra stays still, i.e, ua(k′) = 0;
16: else
17: do the same procedure of [Line 7-15] of Algorithm 3
and obtain ua(k′);
18: end if
19: end if
20: if as = 0 and pv ∈ Nd(pe, rd) then
21: Ra moves into the pre-attack position, as = k;
22: else
23: Ra stays still;
24: end if
25: if
∥∥∥pv(k) − ptrap∥∥∥2 < δ then
26: break;
27: end if
28: end for
29: H = k′, and construct attack input vector ua,0:H ;
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Fig. 6. Illustration of the condition of successful attack.
between two attacks. To tackle the issue, we design a judging
criteria that utilizes the distance from the trap to the line
Lm(pv(k)), which represents the instantaneous motion direction
of Rv at time instant k. Simply speaking, if the distance does
not grow larger, then Ra can stay still if other constraints are
satisfied. The complete algorithm is summarized in Algorithm
4.
There are two major points that need to be addressed in
Algorithm 4. First, after Ra begins its initial attack and the
distance d(k) =
∥∥∥pv(k) − ptrap∥∥∥2 is large, Ra needs to judge
whether to stay still or make a move, using the change of
d(k) as the attack decision criteria. If it needs to make an
attack, like Algorithm 3, the attack inputs are sampled to
explore the motion space of both Ra and Rv and select a best
attack input from a feasible attack set. Second, when d(k) is
relatively small, Ra alters to a new attack decision criteria,
which combines dT (Lm(pv(k)), ptrap) with Ra’s constraints.
Similar with Problem 1, the existence of the optimal solution
is guaranteed. The proof resembles that of Theorem 1 and is
omitted here.
To illustrate the extreme effects of our proposed attack
strategies, we first define the unavailable area for trap setup.
Definition 3: (Unavailable area for trap setup) Given Rv’s
initial position pv(0) and the goal pgoal, divide the 2-D plane
in the X’-Y’ coordinate frame defined in Definition 1. For a
preset ptrap, if there does not exist an attack trajectory Tr such
that the following conditions always hold before the attack
stops, given by LT (pa,Tr)·LT (pgoal,Tr) > 0,LT (pa,Tr)·LT (pgoal,Tr)·LT (ptrap,Tr) < 0, (38)
where LT (·,Tr) is determined by (28), then, we declaim this
preset trap unavailable. The unavailable area for trap setup is
the integration of these position and denoted by SU , as shown
in Fig. 6.
Next, based on the following assumption, a theorem is
proposed to guarantee the success of the attack.
Assumption 4: Assuming Rv is not equipped with specific
attack detection mechanism or countermeasures against the
proposed attack.
Theorem 3: Take Rv’s initial position pv(0) and the goal
pgoal as the diagonals of a square. If ptrap ∈ SU by Definition
3, then Ra can always drive Rv to ptrap by the shortest-attack
or hands-off attack strategy.
Proof 4: Here we provide a simple proof combined with
graphical representation (as shown in Fig. 6). For non-
holonomic robots, the ability of moving backwards is not
considered. The key to a successful attack is to keep Ra at
one side of Rv’s moving direction and keep ptrap, pgoal at the
other side, before the attack stops. For a preset trap in the
allowed area, a solution satisfying the constraints can always
be found by the proposed attack strategies. If the trap is preset
in SU , during the attack process, there will inevitably exist a
time instant at which Ra and pgoal are not at the same side
of Rv’s motion direction. Then, Ra will have little impact
on Rv, and the goal’s impact will take the lead. When this
happens, the success of the attack can never be guaranteed for
the constraints are no longer satisfied. The proof is completed.
E. Attack against holonomic robots
For holonomic robots, their motion control of X-Y di-
rections is independent, which makes learning the obstacle-
avoidance mechanism more easier. Since their motion is
omnidirectional and easy to predict, attacks against holonomic
robots are not subject to the limitations of Theorem 3, i.e,
the preset trap is arbitrary. However, due to the same reason,
the moving ability of Ra must be much stronger than Ra so
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Fig. 7. (a) Intentional learning: Ra collects data of Rv at ‘×’ positions
consecutively. Rv moves from (11.5, 0) to (2, 14). (b) Simple attack: once
Ra appears in (D,α), it makes continuous impacts on Rv in one direction
(here is to the right).
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Fig. 8. Shortest-path attack against non-holonomic robot. The obstacle-
avoidance algorithm of Rv is DWA. (a) The preset trap locates in (5, 12).
Attack iteration time is 89 steps, and the path length after being attacked is
5.52m. (b) The preset trap locates in (−10, 15). Attack iteration time is 296
steps, and the path length after being attacked is 18.35m.
as to be in the next optimal position. Specificly, if obstacle
avoidance mechanism of holonomic mobile robots is in the
form of analytical function, then there is no need to use
sampling-based method to search for the best solution at that
iteration for Ra. Under this circumstance, Ra can directly
obtain the optimal solution by reversely solve the function
while satisfying realtime motion constraints. The details are
omitted here.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we model both non-holonomic and holo-
nomic robots as simulation object. And our evaluation focuses
on two aspects: efficiency and effectiveness. First, the critical
steps of the proposed attack framework are shown. Then,
we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy by
presenting different attack cases. Furthermore, we measure the
attack control inputs to evaluate the efficiency.
Fig. 7(a) shows that Ra collects a series of input and output
by sequential “intentional learning”. It’s a feasible means to
regress the obstacle-avoidance algorithm using the data, when
no prior information of that is available. Fig. 7(b) shows a
simple and rough attack: once Ra appears in (D,α), it predicts
Rv’s next move, and runs in the predicted direction with faster
speed and repeats this process. As expected, Rv should keep
avoiding Ra all the time. However, this attack cannot proceed
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Fig. 9. Illustration of the hands-off attack against holonomic robot. The obstacle-avoidance algorithm of Rv is APF. (a) The preset trap locates in (5, 12).
Attack iteration time is 169 steps, and the path length after being attacked is 6.56m. (b) The control inputs state of hands-off attack and the state 1 means
Ra needs to move and state 0 means Ra stays still. (c) The preset trap locates in (12, 0). Attack iteration time is 261 steps, and the path length after being
attacked is 9.75m. (d) The control inputs state of hands-off attack and the state 1 means Ra needs to move and state 0 means Ra stays still.
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Fig. 10. Illustration of the shortest-path attack against non-holonomic robot.
The obstacle-avoidance algorithm of Rv is DWA. (a) The preset trap locates
in (5, 12). And the path length after being attacked is 5.13m. (b) The preset
trap locates in (−10, 15). And the path length after being attacked is 20.78m.
consistently. We conclude the leading cause lies in two parts: i)
the control inputs are not strictly well-designed by considering
where next (sub-)optimal attack position is; ii) each prediction
will produce certain errors, which are cumulated to influence
the effectiveness the attack in this case. Next, we present the
results of the proposed attack algorithms. By comparison, the
effectiveness of the algorithms is exhibited, remedying the
deficiency of the former one.
Fig. 8 shows that the shortest-path attack strategy against
non-holonomic robot is applied. Two cases are designed where
the trap is preseted as (5, 12) and (−10, 15), respectively. The
traps locates in area S 1 (defined in Fig. 4), and we can observe
that the trajectory of Rv is near to Tra∗.
Fig. 9 shows that the hands-off attack strategy against non-
holonomic robot is applied. Same as last one, two cases are
designed, where the trap is preseted as (5, 12) and (12, 0),
respectively. Comparing Fig. 8(a) with Fig. 9(a), the trajectory
of Rv by hands-off attack twists and turns a little more than
that by shortest-path attack. However, the small sacrifice of
path length largely save the attack times for Rv. As shown in
Fig. 9(b) and 9(d), Rv only needs to attack in part times of
the whole process to implement the attack successfully.
The cases for holonomic mobile robots are presented in
Fig. 9. Note that the trajectory of Rv is not as smooth as
that of non-holonomic robot, i.e, the moving direction of Rv
may suddenly change. Even though this property makes the
movement of Rv more unconstrained, the reaction trajectory
of Rv is not necessarily shorter than that of non-holonomic
robot, as we can see from Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 10(b). The
reason is as follows. If the obstacle detection range of this
obstacle-avoidance model is neglected, we can always obtain
a corresponding obstacle position to make Rv move to any
desired position. Nevertheless, in our design which takes real
situations into consideration, the feasible positions of Ra to
implement an attack is constrained, formulated as (37d) or
(27d) and (27e). Therefore, a desired next-step position may
not be feasible, and we can only choose the position whose
result is closest to the desired position.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the security problem of mobile
robots. Instead of focusing on detection or countermeasures
for attacks based on some assumptions about the system,
we present a physical-based and intelligent attack framework
against the obstacle-avoidance of mobile robots, without any
prior information of the system. The proposed framework
enables the attacker to learn the victim robot’s goal position
and obstacle-detection area. Then, the obstacle mechanism is
regressed by using collected data and learning-based method.
Furthermore, different attack strategies are proposed for differ-
ent attack performance. And the feasibility of attack strategies
is proved with performance guarantees. Extensive simulations
confirm the effectiveness of the intelligent attack framework.
There are still many open issues worth taking as extending
directions. For example, we mainly focus on attack design in
this paper, without more detailed consideration of defence for
the victim robot. How to constitute an integrated framework
containing both attack and defence needs further investigation.
Meanwhile, the scenario considered in this paper is relatively
simple. Applying the idea to more complicated scenarios is
quite meaningful, like multi-robot coordination tasks. In these
applications, another vital challenge will emerge, i.e., how
to acquire the coordination mechanism between robots, and
choose the most important robot as the attack target, obtaining
maximum attack benefits.
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